Introduction
In a note on the security loading of excess loss rates I am deducing a simple formula intended to replace some tedious calculations. In the beginning of that note I made the point that some authors recommend a loading proportional to the dispersion of the total claims amount of a treaty 81 while others tend to favour 812.
I also stated that a loading proportional to 81 or its estimate 81" could be deduced from the statistical uncertainty in measuring the risk (section 4).
The question has been raised if and to what extent a loading system based on the dispersion is unduly punishing the smaller portfolios. This will be examined below.
The pricing concept will be analyzed from the point of view of a big dominating Reinsurer who wants to be fair in all directions. The conclusion of this study supports an affirmative answer to the question put above.
In a second part the loading is studied from a different angle bringing competition into the picture. The pricing or loading becomes a problem of operations research under the simplified assumption that profit is the only purpose of our activity. Not unexpectedly, the loading coming out from this aspect differs from those of part one.
Part two also deals with the question of how much of the loadings which we are aiming for, get lost in the competitive process. It is also shown that in most cases the harder the competilion is, the higher loadings shall be used.
Part one and part two thus deal with the loading problem from different aspects, and illustrate the complexity of the problem. It is my hope that this note could stimulate further researches in this interesting and important area, also in a moment when some SOME ASPECTS ON REINSURANCE PROFITS AND LOADINGS 315 reinsurers are more concerned with the question of surviving than in fixing the loadings which should on the average and in the long run turn up as profits.
Part I --Pricing and loading as a mailer of fairness.
I. Profit can be considered as the reward which the reinsurer should receive because of his willingness to engage his capital and free reserves, in order to take over and carry part of the fluctuation in the gross results of the ceding company.
2. Profit, or rather expectation of profit, is thus the price for carrying variance, i.e. possible fluctuations in the negative direction.
From this basic idea we shall try to develop a pricing concept, the price being understood as an addilion to the expected average pure loss cost. Seen from this angle the "price" or expected profit is equal to the loading. Below we will cultivate this concept mainly with regard to non-proportional reinsurance.
3-It is certainly so that reinsurers during the past years have been in such a situation that prices, defined as above, have often been negative. This might partly be unintentional and explained by the differences of measuring and forecasting the net value of the risk. Further factors are the difficulties of the insurance industry, the exaggerated competition between reinsurers and the premium prestige thinking in several quarters.
4. We agree that situations exist when an intentional underrating can be defended as a means of keeping a long-term connection which is expected to give profits later. Underrating can also be used "to come in" and secure a connection which could be made profitable in the long run.
5. When technicians under-rate, this can sometimes be explained by lack of knowledge and experience. It is also possible that the power structure within some reinsurance companies has promoted the pure selling points of view, on the expense of profitability. In other cases when there is a balance of power between marketing and technical aspects a newly-established technical unit might have to try to sell their services. This is easier when the rates which come out do appear as "reasonable".
6. Do let us leave all this aside and try to see what can come out of the rational concept introduced in the beginning. Let us 3x6 SOME ASPECTS ON REINSURANCE PROFITS AND LOADINGS also just mention the possibility of asking for a special price addition because of the high quality of service which a big Reinsurer can offer its ceding companies.
7. An insurance or reinsurance company possesses a certain portfolio P which has a variance V = ~2 and a loading included in the premiums which totals B. This last quantity will include in some rational way also financial revenues and administration costs, etc. Expected profit under a "normal" year is thus assumed to be B.
8. This company considers accepting and bringing into its portfolio a treaty p with b and ~1-What is a rational price or rating ? We assume that the new treaty ib is stochastically independent of P.
9. Some reinsurance companies might be willing to accept the new treaty if the expected technical result is positive and if financial revenues cover administrative expenses. Others might instead look at the sum of the above three quantities which has to exceed a certain level higher than zero.
IO. Below we will assume that the treaty p is accepted if the company will thereby enter into a new risk situation which is judged as unchanged or better.
IX. The above criterion is too vague and has to be elaborated further. To be more precise we could say: (a) that b shall be fixed in such a way that the risk of getting a negative result shall not increase. When defining such a negative result we could also consider the possibility of mobilizing some free reserves = U; (b) that the mathematical expectation of such a negative result defined with or without U as above shall not increase. Below we shall study under simplified assumptions what loadings will emerge from this criterion.
I2. Let us consider the total portfolio of a company, P, and assume that the results of a certain year are normally distributed (B, ~). We hope that B > o which is unfortunately not ahvays the case. However, we have available a special reserve U and can tolerate a loss of the year up to B + U > o.
If the total claims amount is X the probability of "ruin" is
The addition of a treaty p with b and 81, leads to a new situation with the probability of ruin equal to:
13. Using criterion a) as above, the probability remains unchanged if:
B+U+b

B+U--
As 8~ is small compared with 8 this can be written, the terms of higher order being neglected:
In other words, the loading of the marginal treaty should be proportional to the variance of that treaty. The proportionality factor C a increases with B + U and decreases when the total variance of the portfolio increases. Thus the higher the part of the free reserve available, the more loading we would request on the marginal treaty.
14. If we prefer the stronger criterion in II above, we may first of all define
Dividing by [/~o+ 8~, developing and neglecting the terms of higher order we obtain:
Criterion b) is harder than criterion a) and thus leads to
Here E(z) is identical to the Esscher function. 
It is easily seen from the above that Co/C,, converges quickly towards I when z increases. 16. The above leads to a security loading of premiums proportional to the varico~ce. One advantage with the variance is the additivity on the assumption of independence between treaties. 17 . In our loading or pricing system the pricing is reduced to the fixing of the constant C = Co.
18. If for a whole portfolio this C o is given it is easy to see that a marginal treaty could be accepted at a C < C o. This point will be illustrated below.
The prelnium of the whole portfolio is z~ = E + Co82 ----E + B and let us impose the condition B = l. 8 where l might be 2, 3 or any other positive constant decided. 
k). me)
The relative security loading is thus independent of the size of lhe lreagy.
22. Let us illustrate the above by a simple example and assume that for a certain market the claims distribution in Motor is well described by the Pareto law with ~ = 3.
We then obtain that for a layer (x, kx) the average excess claim I .+-I//e. IO0 000
This means that for the unlimited layer, k = co, we should ask for a proportional loading of IO % in the case of a first risk of I00,000 and 20 ~o in the case of 200,000, etc.
The above can be illustrated in a table which shows the loading in %. 2 4. It has already been mentioned that a loading proportionate to tile dispersion 8 will result from the condition that the individual loaded rate shall have a certain probability to l)e at least equal to the expected pure loss cost. This point combined with the result of tile previous sections thus leads to a loading or pricing of the form
Ct~ + Coy
Since in the future we shall be more skilled in measuring the risk, the first term will diminish in importance and the second will dominate.
These more precise estimates--extremely important because of the competition--may be available through a better knowledge of the claims distribution completed--if a rational concept can be developed--by a credibility approach.
Part 2. Pricing and loading strategy in a competitive market 25 . The above has dealt with the pricing problenas when the reinsurer tries to show the same degree of fairness in all directions.
Let us see what occurs if the reinsurer tries to adapt himself to the conapetitive market and seeks an ol)timal pricing strategy on the assumption that profits are the purpose of his activity.
26. We understand that in real life a great deal of other aims determine the strategy and the pricing but in the simplified model below we assume that profit is the only goal.
27. Let us then study how to price a non-proportional treaty, bearing in mind that the same general reasoning could also be used for a proportional treaty.
We assume that for the cover period we know --the expected burning cost E the costs of handling the treaty C and the cost of quotation and negotiation C O We assume that a quoted rate r is connected with a probability of obtaining the cover equal to p(r).
28. We thus havep(r) >/o and if the market is rationalp'(r) ~ o.
Our rating strategy would be to maximize
g(r) =p(r) (r--E--C)--C O
Differentiating we get g'(r) = p(r) + p'(r) (r--E--C) = o
which gives
From this it appears that: I. The price r o should exceed E + C.
2. That for this optimal price g(ro) can be positive, zero or even negative. 2 9. The rational pricing will thus depend upon the function p(r). Let us especially assume Here a represents our chance of getting the cover when we are quoting E + C and b determines the sensitivity of this probability to changes in the rate. The lower b is, the higher is this sensitivity.
Let us assume that for some particular cases b = 0.2 E; then we should quote ~ = 1.2 E + C and our profit expectation will be g(max) = a.e -1.0.2E-C O . If a = o.Ie c~o 27 O/o we have g(max) = 0.02 E --C o . In other words, our profit becomes 2 % of the expected burning cost of the treaties which we are quoting diminished by the costs of quoting and negotiation of these treaties. Of the treaties we are quoting we succeed in getting ae-1 = I0 %. The variance thus remains unchanged and the whole effect of lhe compelilion is o1~ lhe mean which is reduced by ~/b.
The above result again underlines the importance of a) reducing ~0 i.e. increase the precision in our risk estimates. b) increasing b i.e. reduce the effect of competition and the price sensibility of the ceding company (new products, unconventional excess treaty forms). 32. It is quite possible that in certain cases the loadings which are built into tile rating formulas are fully consumed by the effect of competition, which in tile simplified model used above is measured by 3/b.
Some reinsurers load the rates by adding a term proportional to the dispersion of the annual excess claims cost ~. At one big Reinsurer such addition was 0.4 ~t.
This so-called frequency security loading will be consumed as
If the precision in our risk estimates is such that ~ = ~/4, the frequency severity loading is consumed if b ~ o.625 ~t. A high competition gives a small b and the above condition may thus often be satisfied.
The loading or "price" should thus be at least 8~/b. 33. We now intend to seek the size of the optimal loading h to be added to our estimation of E + C.
We haver o =E +C + h. When quoting r the expected profit is p(r) . (r --E --C) multiplying this with the distribution of r and integrating we obtain
If we put t = r --E --C we obtain
--e -gu,) = I : 7, ~o p2r:
Not unexpectedly, we obtain a loading or price equal to b, i.e. the result of section 29 above, increased by the minimum loading 8~/b which results from the lack of precision in our estimate of the risk.
34. In the above model the price h is thus equal to h(b) = b + 8~/b which has a minimum h = 28 o when b = 80 .
Ceding companies and reinsurers thus seem to have a common interest to try to form a reinsurance market such that b is not too far away from 8 o .
35-If 8o = 8d2 which seems to be a plausible assumption when five-year statistics are used to determine E and 8, we get a minimum price 280 = 81.
36. It seems plausible that b is mostly less than 8 o. Whenever b < 80 an increased compelilion, i.e. decrease in b, results in an increase in lhe optimal loading h. As the loading--assuming all optimal market structure--is 280 = 8, the above means that we can expect to obtain in profits a maximum of 3 % of the sum of the loadings we are shooting for in our quotations. From this we wiU have to deduct of course costs for quoting and negotiating excess treaties. 38. The above is meant to illustrate the difficulties of making profits in a competitive maflcet, also where the rating is brought up to a reasonable level. It thus does not primarily illustrate the troubles of several Motor Excess reinsurers which were mainly explained by some lack of technical knowledge and in cases also lack of experience which has led to substantial under-rating.
